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Supervisor Elham AbolFateh
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Russia Cuts Gold Reserves by 43.5 Tonnes as Budget Pressures Mount


Gold Prices

Wed 22 Jul 2026 | 04:28 PM
Waleed Farouk

Russia’s central bank has entered a new phase in its gold reserve strategy in 2026, shifting from one of the world’s largest sovereign gold buyers to a net seller as mounting fiscal pressures force the government to tap strategic assets for liquidity.

According to the latest data released by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), the country's official gold reserves declined to 73.4 million troy ounces (approximately 2,282 tonnes) at the end of June, down by 1.4 million ounces, or 43.5 tonnes, since the beginning of the year.

The decline marks one of the most significant reductions in Russia’s gold holdings in more than two decades. However, rather than signaling a retreat from gold as a strategic reserve asset, analysts say the move reflects a shift in the metal’s role—from long-term reserve accumulation to a source of liquidity for financing government spending and managing the National Wealth Fund (NWF).

Gold Reserve Value Falls Below $300 Billion

The Central Bank estimated the value of Russia’s gold holdings at $299 billion at the end of June, compared with $325.9 billion a month earlier.

The decline was driven not only by the reduction in physical holdings but also by lower international gold prices during the month.

Meanwhile, Russia’s total international reserves fell to $720.4 billion from $747.4 billion in May, while foreign currency reserves remained virtually unchanged at around $392.4 billion.

This indicates that most of the monthly decline in total reserves came from the gold component, reflecting both lower volumes and market revaluation.

Moving Against the Global Trend

Russia’s gold sales stand in sharp contrast to the broader global trend.

According to the World Gold Council, central banks collectively purchased a net 41 tonnes of gold in May, led by Poland, China, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

Russia, by contrast, was among the few significant sellers. The CBR reduced its holdings by roughly 34 tonnes during the first five months of 2026, with June data pushing the cumulative decline to 43.5 tonnes since the start of the year.

This means the central bank disposed of approximately 9.5 additional tonnes during June alone.

The move comes despite growing optimism among central banks worldwide, with the World Gold Council’s latest survey showing that most reserve managers expect official global gold holdings to continue rising over the coming year.

Why Is Russia Selling Gold?

The answer lies largely in the structure of Russia’s National Wealth Fund.

The Central Bank has previously explained that it conducts domestic gold and yuan transactions to offset operations carried out by the Ministry of Finance through the NWF.

When the government draws on the fund to finance spending, the Central Bank executes corresponding market operations by selling either gold or Chinese yuan to maintain monetary balance.

As a result, gold sales should not necessarily be viewed as an independent monetary policy decision, but rather as part of a broader fiscal mechanism supporting government expenditures.

Since 2023, the liquid assets of the National Wealth Fund have been concentrated primarily in Chinese yuan (60%) and gold (40%), following the removal of the U.S. dollar and euro from the fund’s liquid asset structure.

As domestic gold market liquidity has improved, the Central Bank has increasingly relied on gold transactions alongside yuan operations.

Budget Deficit Drives Reserve Sales

The acceleration in gold sales has coincided with a widening federal budget deficit.

Russia’s budget shortfall reached approximately 5.73 trillion rubles during the first half of 2026, equivalent to 2.5% of GDP and about 1.7 times larger than during the same period last year.

Government projections suggest the full-year deficit could reach 4.83 trillion rubles, reflecting higher-than-planned expenditures, particularly in defense and military-related spending.

Analysts therefore expect continued use of liquid National Wealth Fund assets—including both gold and yuan—to finance fiscal needs if budget pressures persist.

Gold Has Become More Liquid

For years, limited domestic market liquidity constrained the Central Bank’s ability to conduct large-scale gold operations inside Russia.

However, international sanctions and the freezing of part of Russia’s foreign assets have accelerated the development of the domestic gold market.

The Central Bank acknowledged in late 2025 that it had significantly expanded its gold operations as domestic market liquidity improved. Unable to purchase bullion freely on international markets because of sanctions, it increasingly relied on transactions with Russian producers, banks, and financial institutions.

Trading activity reflects that transformation.

Gold trading volume on the Moscow Exchange reached 42.6 tonnes during one recent month of 2026, up more than 350% year-on-year, while the value of transactions surged fivefold to 534.4 billion rubles.

These figures suggest Russia’s domestic market is now capable of absorbing sizeable government gold transactions without requiring large-scale exports to international markets.

Was Gold Sold for Yuan?

Some analysts believe part of the bullion was exchanged for Chinese yuan.

However, official reserve data show that Russia’s foreign currency holdings remained virtually unchanged between May and June, providing little evidence of a substantial shift from gold into foreign exchange.

This suggests that most of the transactions were likely linked to domestic fiscal operations associated with the National Wealth Fund rather than a broad conversion of gold into foreign currencies.

Not the End of Russia’s De-Dollarization Strategy

Although the reduction of 43.5 tonnes is significant, it represents less than 2% of Russia’s total official gold holdings.

With approximately 2,282 tonnes still in reserve, Russia remains one of the world's largest sovereign gold holders.

The country accumulated the bulk of its gold between 2002 and 2020, purchasing more than 1,900 tonnes, including roughly 1,200 tonnes between 2014 and 2019, as part of its long-term strategy to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar and strengthen financial resilience against sanctions.

Since 2020, however, net purchases have slowed dramatically before turning into net sales in 2026.

Rather than abandoning its de-dollarization policy, Russia appears to be using gold for one of the very purposes that motivated its accumulation: providing a liquid strategic asset capable of supporting the economy during periods of financial stress and restricted access to Western financial markets.

A Domestic Paradox

While the state is reducing its official gold reserves, Russian households continue to increase their gold purchases.

Investment demand has remained strong as consumers seek protection against inflation, ruble volatility, and limited access to foreign investment products.

Russian consumers bought 75.6 tonnes of gold in 2024—roughly one-quarter of the country's annual mine production—while domestic trading volumes have continued to expand throughout 2026.

The contrast is striking: the government is monetizing part of its gold reserves to finance public spending, while households are accumulating gold to preserve purchasing power.

Limited Impact on the Global Gold Market

Despite the sizeable reduction in official holdings, Russia’s sales are unlikely to have a major direct impact on international gold prices.

Most transactions appear to be taking place within the domestic market rather than through large-scale bullion sales into global exchanges.

Meanwhile, continued purchases by central banks such as China and Poland have more than offset Russian sales, leaving global official-sector demand firmly positive.

Nevertheless, Russia’s experience illustrates an important reality: gold is not merely a reserve asset held for emergencies—it can also function as a practical financial instrument for governments facing fiscal pressures and restricted access to foreign capital markets.

Whether Russia continues reducing its gold reserves during the second half of 2026 will largely depend on three factors: the evolution of the federal budget deficit, oil and gas revenues, and the remaining liquid assets within the National Wealth Fund.

If government spending continues to outpace revenues, further gold sales are likely.

Should energy revenues recover or fiscal pressures ease, however, the pace of reserve reductions may slow, as Moscow still considers gold a cornerstone of its long-term reserve strategy.

For now, Russia’s gold policy has entered a new phase—not abandoning gold, but putting it to work as a strategic financial asset in one of the country's most challenging economic periods.