The scorpions’ struggle inside the regime: The battle is no longer only over an agreement, but over who owns its narrative

The regime’s newspapers reveal that internal disputes inside the ruling establishment are no longer temporary tactical disagreements. They have become an open struggle over the regime’s future. The phrase "the scorpions’ struggle" accurately describes the division between factions that want negotiations to reduce pressure and others that seek to use war and tension to eliminate their rivals inside the system. In this struggle, each faction does not only confront its rival; it may also sting its closest allies if it feels that its position, narrative, or share of power is threatened.

Tosee Irani presented this conflict through the controversy surrounding Saeed Laylaz’s remarks about Mohammad Javad Zarif, the leaked audio file, the recent war, and negotiations with the United States. Laylaz, once seen as close to the moderate camp and as a defender of the JCPOA, is now reassessing that experience in language closer to hardline discourse: distrust of America, warnings against weakness, and skepticism toward reliance on the West. This is not merely a personal shift; it reflects a broader movement inside the ruling elite.

On the other side, figures such as Ahmad Zeidabadi warn against normalizing war and turning exhaustion into a permanent policy. The core disagreement is not only economic or diplomatic; it is about the meaning of survival. Does the regime survive by negotiating and limiting its losses, or by continuing confrontation regardless of the social and economic cost?

Mahmoud Nabavian expressed the sharpest version of this conflict when he said that the "JCPOA people must be removed." This statement shows that hardliners are not merely opposing a deal; they want to monopolize any possible deal. In other words, if negotiations become unavoidable, they want them to proceed without Zarif, without Rouhani’s circle, and without allowing moderates to claim credit. The real battle is therefore not only whether an agreement will happen, but who will own its narrative if it does.

This explains the effort to bring Ghalibaf and Jalili under one umbrella despite their previous rivalries. The aim is to create a new center of gravity inside the regime: one capable of negotiating if necessary, but from a hardline position, while excluding the old "JCPOA camp." This reveals a deep paradox: the regime may move toward negotiations while trying to bury the very figures historically associated with negotiation.

Arman Melli focused on another key point: opponents of negotiation offer no realistic alternative except endless war. It asks, in effect, if negotiation is rejected, is the alternative war without end? This question exposes the regime’s dilemma: war drains it, while negotiation tears it apart from within.

In conclusion, the "scorpions’ struggle" is no longer a classic battle between reformists and conservatives. It is also taking place inside each camp. Some former moderates are distancing themselves from the JCPOA narrative, some hardliners are trying to monopolize the negotiation track, and everyone is moving under the pressure of fear: fear of the street, economic collapse, and the consequences of war. It is the image of a regime whose narratives are eroding from within before its external opponents even strike.

These activities also coincide with broad preparations for the major Iranian demonstration scheduled to take place in Paris on June 20. The demonstration aims to highlight the human rights situation in Iran and support the Iranian people’s right to freedom and democratic change. In this context, the demonstration stands out as a voice entirely opposed to this equation: a voice saying that Iran’s future will not be made inside the rooms of the scorpions’ struggle in Tehran, but by the will of a people seeking to overthrow tyranny and build an organized democratic alternative.