Amid this backdrop of weakened Arab states after the so called Arab Spring, the events of October 7, 2023 introduced a devastating shock. On that day, the Palestinian group Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel, and the aftermath proved calamitous not only for Israelis and Palestinians but for the entire region. Israel’s response – a massive war on Gaza – did more than devastate the Gaza Strip; it created a ripple effect of instability and opened the door for Israel’s leaders to aggressively push long-held agendas.
In the wake of the Hamas attack, Israel (a self-defined “Jewish state” often criticized as an apartheid or settler-colonial entity) seized the opportunity to reassert and expand its power across the region.
The war on Gaza, and the muted or divided Arab reaction to it, emboldened Israel to “tamper” in regional affairs in ways previously restrained. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right allies began to openly speak of reshaping the Middle East’s map. Remarkably, Netanyahu even endorsed the once-fringe vision of a “Greater Israel.” In a television interview, he affirmed that he “very much” connects to a map of Greater Israel, a concept which historically includes not just all of historic Palestine but also territorial ambitions stretching into neighboring Arab countries . This was no offhand remark – coming on the heels of the Gaza war, it signaled that Israeli expansionist aspirations had moved from whispered ideology to public discourse.
Netanyahu described his mission in almost messianic terms and pointed to a “historic” and “spiritual” calling, even if he stopped short of naming specific borders . The Greater Israel idea, well-known in Zionist extremism, envisions Israel expanding into the West Bank and Gaza (which it already occupies), parts of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and even Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula . That the Israeli prime minister could allude approvingly to such a plan openly – and face only tepid international pushback – is astonishing. Such audacity would have been unthinkable before the regional chaos of recent years.
Indeed, Netanyahu’s comments provoked alarm across the Arab world; dozens of Arab and Muslim foreign ministers condemned the “blatant and dangerous” talk of a Greater Israel as a direct threat to regional security and state sovereignty .
Israeli leaders have not limited themselves to words. Since October 7, they have acted on the sense that a strategic window has opened. Netanyahu has boasted of “tremendous achievements” in the Gaza war and claimed that Israel’s actions have “changed the face of the Middle East.” “The decisions we made in the war have already changed the face of the Middle East,” he announced in early 2025, praising the courage of Israeli soldiers for having “redrawn the map” . Such language is telling: Israel sees itself as remaking the region’s geopolitical contours in its favor.
Netanyahu even hinted that working closely with a sympathetic Washington could allow Israel to “redraw it even further” . In practical terms, Israel’s war on Hamas in Gaza has reportedly morphed into a plan to conquer and permanently control Gaza . High-ranking Israeli officials have signaled that this is not merely a temporary punitive expedition but an intent to reoccupy territory: for instance, the head of Mossad reportedly told regional intermediaries that Israel intends a long-term presence in Gaza, not just the elimination of Hamas . Some Israeli voices have gone so far as to propose transferring Gaza’s population into Egypt’s Sinai – effectively a new Nakba – and re-annexing Sinai up to the Nile, an area Israel briefly controlled in the 20th century . Israeli forces have also struck targets in south Lebanon and Syria in recent months, asserting the right to neutralize threats across its borders.
One Israeli minister’s map infamously erased Jordan, reimagining it as part of Israel – a reflection of how bold Israeli ultranationalists have become in this climate. Israel’s leaders now openly say they are “changing the face” of the region and claim this war is the culmination of plans “we were mapping out for the last 10-15 years.” In short, the October 7 attacks became the catalyst for Israel to implement an aggressive agenda it had long been formulating.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Israel’s hawkish leadership was prepared for – and perhaps even quietly counting on – a moment like October 7 to justify its expansionist ambitions. The unprecedented intelligence failure that allowed Hamas to wreak havoc on southern Israel has sparked widespread speculation. How did one of the world’s most advanced security states not see this coming? Some in the region wonder if elements within Israel’s establishment allowed the attack to happen, or even manipulated Hamas into launching it, in order to unleash a pretext for war that would enable Israel to carry out pre-existing plans. After all, every outcome since that day has aligned with what hardliners in Israel have wanted: the crushing of Gaza, the neutralization of Hamas, the intimidation of Hezbollah and other foes, and the chance to redraw regional borders under the banner of fighting “terrorism.” The author of this piece subscribes to the view that October 7 was not a mere intelligence lapse, but rather a trap set by Israel, executed indirectly through Hamas’s actions, to legitimize an Israeli agenda a decade in the making. Israel’s own statements lend credence to this perspective. Its leaders speak of long-term strategies now being realized; Netanyahu’s triumphant assertion that the map is being redrawn and that this was “planned…for years” is telling . Whether or not one endorses conspiracy theories, there is no question that Israel had contingency plans ready – and once the opportunity arose, they moved swiftly to enact them under the cover of wartime necessity. Arab disunity and state weakness made this far easier. A fractured Arab world struggled to mount any coordinated response beyond rhetoric. With Egypt wary of instability on its border, Jordan under pressure, Syria and Iraq still recovering from their own conflicts, and Gulf states preoccupied or even tacitly aligned with Israel, there was no effective resistance to Israel’s expansive war aims. In the end, when nations fall apart, others prevail: the internal collapse of key Arab states left a vacuum that external powers like Israel are all too eager to fill.
The twin tragedies of the post-2011 Arab collapse and the post-2023 Israeli offensive carry a stark lesson. The Arab world’s most severe wounds in recent memory have been self-inflicted to a significant extent – the result of imploding states and civil strife that invited opportunistic exploitation by outside forces. The wreckage of the Arab Spring shows that destroying a tyrannical regime is not enough; without a coherent plan and capable institutions to replace it, a revolution can devour its own gains and leave a country worse off than before. The aftermath of October 7 shows that a weakened, divided regional order cannot shield itself from a determined hegemon next door. If the revolts of 2011 were a righteous cry for dignity that turned into chaos, the war of 2023 is a reminder that those chaotic conditions can be used by others to reshape the region’s destiny in their own favor.
Arab societies now face the arduous task of rebuilding from within – rebuilding trust, institutions, and national unity – to immunize themselves against such predation. It will not be quick or easy; as noted, countries like Yemen, Libya, and Syria lie in ruins and may take generations to recover . But the urgency of reforming and strengthening state institutions cannot be overstated. The only way to prevent the next disaster is to address the grievances that sparked unrest while ensuring any change doesn’t dismantle the pillars holding society together. In practical terms, that means nurturing inclusive governance, fighting corruption, and professionalizing state agencies so that never again will our nations crumble overnight. The real threat is not an external invader but the vacuum of authority at home. Filling that vacuum with accountable, experienced leadership and robust institutions is the surest safeguard against both internal collapse and external aggression. Without it, the Arab world risks remaining a chessboard for others’ ambitions – where revolutions have no happy end, and wars redraw maps at our expense. Only by heeding these hard lessons can the region hope to emerge from this dark chapter and chart a future on its own terms.