It is clear that the issue of the Vienna talks to revive the nuclear deal between Iran’ mullahs regime and the P5+1 group is no longer about whether its serious or not, but about what the end game will be. Most signs bear out that things are going according to plan.
Any failure would be due to the intransigence of the Iranian side. This is because the Biden administration seems willing to make major concessions in exchange for a deal with Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s chief negotiator in Vienna.
Recently, he said the US at the Vienna nuclear talks has expressed a willingness to lift many of the sanctions imposed on Iran, but Tehran is demanding more. He said the negotiations would continue “until all our demands are met.”
Araghchi, who in his statement seemed overconfident that he would get what he wanted, gives a glimpse of the Iranian negotiation strategy. This strategy already got Iran what it wanted in 2015 through marathon negotiations. The mullahs are betting on the possibility of replicating that in Vienna.
President Biden himself is not even sure the mullahs can resume their commitments to the nuclear deal. He admits they are serious about their negotiations. “Yes, but how serious, and what they are prepared to do is a different story. But we’re still talking,” he says.
We are facing a deja-vu scenario of negotiations with Iran. Risk is that they end up getting what they want. That’s because their negotiating ceiling is too high than it is supposed to. So they are likely to reach a deal that revives the 2015 agreement on the same terms.
The question that inevitably arises: What’s next? Bringing the agreement back into force is not an achievement in itself. But it is a step that the Biden administration sees as a prelude to launching other steps on developing the agreement itself to include other issues. That’s only doubtful, at least during President Biden’s first presidential term.
For Israel, reaching an agreement on reviving the nuclear deal could be a real upset. Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen has said that war with Tehran would inevitably follow the revival of the deal.
Cohen reiterated Israel’s position that it is not constrained by diplomatic efforts. “A bad deal will send the region spiraling into war,” he told Reuters, adding that Israel will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. “Our planes can reach everywhere in the Middle East - and certainly Iran. ”
These statements are certainly intended to put as much pressure as possible on the Vienna negotiations, especially on Iran and the US. It is to get the former to soften its negotiating terms, and to get the latter to harden its.
Different objectives, they are difficult to achieve together for several considerations. The Iranian mullahs’ regime is often suicidal. Conventional norms do not apply to its brand of political and negotiating behavior.
The Biden administration is seeking in various ways to achieve a qualitative breakthrough in one of its top priorities. It’s hard to say that anyone is heeding Israel’s threats of war right now. Everyone is busy looking for ways out of the current impasse in Vienna.
More importantly, the obvious question is whether Israel can go beyond the limits of its relationship with the US alliance, to wage a war against the mullahs’ regime regardless of the White House’s will?
Trying to answer is related to two elements. The first concerns the military operational aspect of any supposed plan to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. The second concerns the political environment of the military decision. Both elements refer to complex issues.
The million-dollar question in this hypothetical is not only about the outcome of an Israeli military strike against the Iranian nuclear system. It is mostly about the aftermath of the strike.
There is the question of how the mullahs would react to such an attack. There is also the position of the US. The Americans will have no choice but to support Israel’s strategic ally and not leave it alone in a possible military confrontation.
Of course, there are technical aspects that tempt Israeli decision-makers to go for the attack plan and replay the scenario of Iraq’s Osirak reactor. A new regional geostrategic reality may help overcome some of the logistical and operational obstacles that hampered the previous plan to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.
But the presence of Iranian nuclear facilities in different regions, the complete lack of certainty that these facilities are real, and that there are no hidden secret facilities, limit the effectiveness of the strike. I think that is the main difficulty, not just the post-attack scenarios.
Israel has a reasonable fear that the mullahs will win a new round of negotiations on the nuclear program. Everyone in our region is fully aware of what is coming next.
As its coffers fill up with funds and it gets the political green light, it will go ahead with its expansionist plans. Then, it would be all the more difficult to agree on pulling out its militias from Syria, Yemen, Iraq and other countries.
The GCC countries are the most au fait with the psychology of the mullahs’ regime and can therefore understand Israel’s reasons for concern, as they experience a similar relationship with the mullahs.
The post-agreement scenario looks dismal because it means going backwards - the administration has failed to learn from past experiences. All possibilities remain in place because no one can live under threat or wait for the unknown.
The profit and loss calculations made by strategists will not be entirely accurate in their facts and results. This is because in circumstances of mounting existential pressures, rational calculations are slightly overshadowed by self-defense and leaders’ quest to reassure their people. This is what the international powers must take note of.
The fate of the Middle East should not be left to the mullahs. Concerns of other regional parties must be taken into account and a broader framework of negotiation must be put in place. Otherwise, the Middle East is left open to the unknown.
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