Amos Harel, the chief military analyst at the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, wrote that what happened on the morning of September 25, when Hezbollah launched a missile at central Israel for the first time since the start of the war, and it was intercepted by the “David’s Sling” defense system, moves the ball back into Tel Aviv’s court.
According to news reports from various media outlets on September 27, the attack and the response taken by Netanyahu’s government focused on a direct targeting of Hezbollah's main leadership (Mr. Nasrallah) following a series of strikes aimed at military leaders and the first tier. The ball has significantly returned to Tel Aviv's court.
In the context of the rapid succession of events in our region, the new news comes just a few days before the anniversary of the events of October 7, during which Israel experienced significant failures at both the intelligence and operational levels.
Israel sought to compensate for these through systematic operations outside its territories, aimed at Iran, the resistance axis, and its leaders. Referring to Harel's article, he indicated that Netanyahu benefits from what is happening, as his supporters celebrate him as a strategic genius. As usual, operational successes are attributed to him, while any shortcomings are blamed on lower leaders or ministers. Despite the successive strikes on the southern suburb of Beirut, some military experts in the occupying state criticize the IDF for achieving tactical successes while still operating without a clear strategy.
To contribute—if only a little—to understanding the ongoing transformations and the complexities they entail (the international gas supplier market, land and maritime connectivity initiatives), it is worth recalling that what happened to Hezbollah in 1992 (the assassination of al-Musawi) and its recurrence in 2024 did not witness effective movement from Tehran to prevent or avoid it.
The Israeli journalist close to Washington, Barak Ravid, posted a message quoting Western sources that Hezbollah urged Tehran in the past few days to launch an attack against Israel in retaliation for the assassination of Hamas's political bureau chief, Haniyeh. However, Iran refrained, considering the timing inappropriate due to President Raisi’s presence in New York to attend the UN General Assembly. It is noteworthy that Raisi himself indicated in a media interview on the sidelines of the UN meeting that Tehran does not want war (should Iran participate directly, it is unlikely that Washington would remain on the sidelines). In an assessment by Oded Granot, a journalist at Israel Hayom, Raisi’s words seem directed at Hezbollah. It is likely that the ally stood on the sidelines and left Hezbollah alone to absorb the changes that have occurred in the rules of engagement and traditional conflict.
However, it appears that time has not been on its leadership’s side, which perhaps paid the price for a slow realization of the unsustainability of the deterrent and stability equation in light of the geoeconomic interests that have begun to govern the stakes and options of every state in the region.
Regardless of what is happening in the Middle East, with escalation on various fronts, one must not overlook that the region and its adjacent areas (particularly the Eastern Mediterranean) are heading toward significant strategic fluctuations at both the political and economic levels. This is particularly true given the growing importance of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Since Tel Aviv has future strategic interests in disconnecting Lebanon from Iranian energy, Israel and Lebanon signed an agreement in October 2022 to demarcate their maritime borders (Tehran welcomed the agreement at the time, viewing it as providing financial returns to Lebanon and Hezbollah).
Therefore, the new reality on the Lebanese scene and its repercussions for the future of Syria and its neighboring countries are worthy of monitoring and analysis due to their impact on energy projects and the existing and potential electrical connections extending to Europe.