“Iran Between Two Tyrannies: No Shah, No Mullah… and in Yemen we say: No to the Houthis — Betting on the People and Organized Resistance”

One of the most dangerous afflictions for any society is not a lack of information, but an abundance of manufactured illusions. Modern Iran has repeatedly witnessed the production of “saviors” packaged as destiny—only for each wave to collapse and leave behind deeper disillusionment. There was a time when propaganda claimed “millions could see Khomeini on the moon,” until people realized it was nothing more than a grand deception. Then came Khatami, sold as “reform,” and the public learned again that the architecture of velayat-e faqih does not reform itself. The “green” moment followed, and millions were drawn into hopes that ultimately remained trapped under the regime’s own ceiling. Then the “purple” wave arrived under Rouhani, with long lines at polling stations—only to end with the same outcome: repression, plunder, and a system that does not change by cosmetics.

Now, another illusion is being repackaged under a new name: “Pahlavi.” The idea seems to be to move Iranians from a “turban” to a “crown,” from one form of tyranny to another—changing the face while preserving the logic of authoritarian rule. Yet a society that has paid dearly under both models is more alert than ever. That is why the slogan “No Shah, No Mullah” resonates: it is not emotion, but the distilled conclusion of lived experience.

This is also why difficult questions are increasingly directed at Reza Pahlavi when he presents himself as a sympathetic voice for today’s victims. Genuine empathy cannot be selective. Many Iranians recall stories of civilians—children included—killed by the Shah’s security apparatus in the final months of that era. Activists often cite the case of a child named Behrouz Behroozi (born September 1971), who is said to have been shot and killed in Semnan in January 1979, alongside two other children in similar incidents. The question is straightforward: does Reza Pahlavi acknowledge these accounts, and does he clearly condemn the state violence carried out under his father’s rule?

More important than history is the day after history: what guarantees exist? A society that has tasted repression does not want to exchange one police state for another. When some voices around this current speak in vengeful language—threatening opponents with “burning them with oil” or hinting at mass retribution—fear of repetition becomes legitimate, not propaganda.

Disinformation completes the picture. Instead of respecting public awareness, numbers are inflated to manufacture a ready-made leadership. A striking example is the promotion of a “250,000-strong” crowd in Munich supporting Pahlavi. The core problem is not the number itself, but the mindset: turning propaganda into “fact” and demanding public submission. Iranians—inside the country and across the diaspora—have shown that they are far too conscious to legitimize a return to the Shah’s dictatorship, or to accept a new authoritarian project dressed in old symbols.

From a Yemeni perspective, Iran’s domestic struggle cannot be separated from the regional behavior of velayat-e faqih. The theocratic establishment has exported militias, weapons, and war economies—not stability or development. In Yemen, the Houthis are a stark example of an instrument used to prolong devastation: suppressing society, recruiting youth, imposing extortion, monopolizing politics, and keeping war alive. That is why we in Yemen say what Iranians say at home: “No to the Houthis,” just as “No Shah, No Mullah.” Tyranny is tyranny, even when the names differ.

The solution, therefore, is neither a foreign war that turns nations into fuel, nor appeasement that extends the life of the executioner, nor a recycling of past symbols. The only realistic path is betting on the Iranian people—and on organized resistance capable of driving change from within, offering a political alternative that prevents chaos, blocks the return of authoritarianism, and ensures that the blood of children and victims is never again exploited as propaganda. Iran needs a state of law and citizenship—neither a new Shah nor an old Mullah.