From the Strait of Hormuz to Arab and Gulf States: Why the Era of Appeasing Tehran’s Regime Is Over

Newspapers published inside Iran reveal that the regime of Velayat-e Faqih is experiencing one of its most confused and fragile moments in years. The war has not truly ended, negotiations with the United States have not evolved into a serious path toward a stable settlement, and the Strait of Hormuz has failed to provide Tehran with decisive leverage. What emerges from the writings of Ettelaat, Tosee Irani, Donya-e Eqtesad, Jahan-e Sanat, Arman Melli, and Javan is that the regime is trapped between two fears: the fear of returning to a large-scale war it cannot afford, and the fear of accepting an agreement that could impose political, security, and economic concessions capable of shaking its internal balance.

At the center of this equation stands the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran seeks to portray it as a card of strength against the United States, Gulf countries, and the broader international community. Yet the regime is also aware that excessive escalation in Hormuz could internationalize Gulf security, strengthen Western military presence, and potentially create a wider international consensus against Iran. On the other hand, retreating from escalation risks making the regime appear weak before its own supporters. This contradiction reflects the crisis of a system that relies on threats for survival while fearing the consequences of its own threats.

However, the crisis extends beyond Hormuz and nuclear negotiations. Gulf countries, particularly the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, have for years faced a consistent pattern of hostility from Tehran, involving interference, incitement, proxy networks, and attempts to destabilize domestic security. What Gulf security services continue to uncover—from arrests of regime-linked operatives to the disruption of espionage cells connected to the IRGC—is not a series of isolated incidents, but rather part of a long-standing and systematic pattern of behavior.

For this reason, it no longer makes sense for Arab states, especially Gulf countries, to bet on negotiations changing Tehran’s behavior. Decades of experience have shown that every agreement with Tehran becomes another opportunity for delay and deception, while every policy of appeasement gives the regime more time to reorganize its military, security, and regional tools. The problem is not a specific diplomatic dispute or negotiation clause; the problem lies in the very nature of the regime itself—a regime that survives through domestic repression and the export of crises abroad.

"June 20 Demonstration in Paris: A Message of Democratic Alternative"

In this context, the major Iranian demonstration scheduled to take place in Paris on June 20 carries special political significance. It aims to highlight the human rights situation in Iran and support the Iranian people’s right to freedom and democratic change. It also underscores the presence of an organized alternative represented by the National Council of Resistance of Iran and its declared provisional government, presented as a democratic political framework reflecting the aspirations of Iranians for a non-nuclear, non-sectarian state that does not export terrorism or interfere in the affairs of neighboring countries.

The message that should reach Arab capitals, especially Gulf capitals, is clear: do not wait for reform from within a regime built on a "scorpions’ struggle," and do not rely on negotiations that only buy it more time. The time has come to abandon appeasement, recognize the Iranian people’s right to change, and extend a hand to the organized democratic alternative and provisional government that represent the possibility of a different Iran—an Iran at peace with its neighbors, respectful of state sovereignty, and permanently detached from the logic of militias, blackmail, and war.