During an inspection of the Mount Geumgang tourist area in October 2019—a site constructed with South Korean investment—North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ordered that “the shabby South Korean facilities, which are so unpleasant to see, be removed completely,” signaling his intention to pursue the tourism industry on North Korea’s own terms. Since then, North Korea has sought to revitalize its tourism sector with projects in Wonsan-Galma coastal area and Samjiyeon near Mount Baekdu, both of which Kim Jong-un personally inspected in succession in July 2024.
This reflects Kim’s focused interest in tourism—not merely as a means of economic 'survival,' but as a 'developmental' achievement intended to distinguish himself from his predecessors.
The primary targets of North Korea's tourism industry continue to be neighboring China and Russia, with China being its largest customer. According to a 2019 estimate by a Chinese state-run media outlet, approximately 200,000 Chinese tourists visited North Korea in 2018, accounting for 90% of all foreign visitors. In the wake of recent North Korea-Russia cooperation, a tourist train is set to begin operations in May of this year between Vladivostok and the Rason (Rajin-Seonbong) area.
Diversifying the range of tourist source markets could further enhance the tourism sector. If U.S.-North Korea relations improve and North Korea succeeds in attracting American and Western tourists, the resulting inflow could significantly benefit its economy. Following the 2018 U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore, President Trump also expressed interest in North Korea’s tourism potential, noting the country’s numerous “waterfront properties.”
North Korea’s image as a “hermit kingdom,” combined with its undeveloped but scenic natural landscapes, presents considerable tourism potential. However, Kim Jong-un and the North Korean leadership must reflect on why, despite this potential, the tourism sector has struggled to advance. Key lessons can be drawn from past cases of inter-Korean tourism cooperation. South Korean tours to Mount Geumgang were conducted from November 1998 to July 2018, while tourism to Gaesong operated from December 2007 to November 2008; both programs are now suspended.
Although the possibility of tourism to Mount Baekdu was discussed during the three inter-Korean summits in 2018, it ultimately failed to produce tangible outcomes.
The suspension of inter-Korean tourism cooperation was largely shaped by political and military relations between the two sides, but North Korea’s poor tourism infrastructure also played a significant role. First, tourism cannot thrive on scenic landscapes alone: tourists not only seek quality facilities and natural attractions but also look for opportunities to engage with the host country's history, culture, and everyday life. Even those who favor luxury seaside resorts typically spend part of their stay shopping or exploring local areas. In the digital age, travelers also seek various information about destinations before they visit. This requires transparency, information-sharing, and an environment that allows interaction between tourists and local residents. Inter-Korean tourism initiatives in Gaesong and Mount Geumgang failed to meet these expectations. In fact, North Korea’s focus on developing areas like Wonsan-Galma and Samjiyeon reflects the regime’s preference for locations where tourists can be easily isolated from the general population.
Second, for tourism to grow, local residents must not feel alienated or hostile toward tourists. This requires a widespread perception that tourism revenue help improve their quality of life. The inter-Korean tourism initiative at Mount Geumgang was initially expected to benefit North Korean residents; however, it ultimately gave rise to suspicions that a substantial portion of the funds was diverted to the development of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear arms, or channeled into Kim’s personal governing funds. Moreover, if—as was suspected in the case of the past Gaesong Industrial Complex—residents are relocated or evacuated away from tourists, such actions are likely to foster resentment and rejection among the local population.
Third, for tourism in North Korea to be revitalized, the more than ten UN sanctions resolutions must be lifted. Under current sanctions, profit-driven transactions with and the provision of bulk cash to North Korea are prohibited—posing significant barriers to large-scale tourism investment and the involvement of reputable companies. Therefore, if Kim Jong-un and the North Korean leadership are serious about developing the economy through tourism, they must first demonstrate a commitment to abandoning weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear arms, and to pursuing meaningful reform and openness. Tourism revenue should be directed not toward WMD programs, but toward investments in roads and other infrastructure that are essential for sustainable tourism development. These benefits must also extend to the North Korean population. Without a genuine willingness to change, any form of tourism cooperation risks becoming a ‘dirty deal’ that serves only to secure the personal survival or enrichment of the regime.
If the promotion of North Korea’s tourism industry can contribute to denuclearization, peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region, and the improvement of human rights and well-being for the North Korean people, it would be welcomed by all nations, including South Korea. However, tourism cooperation would be meaningless if it merely serves to fill the personal coffers of a one-man dictator, provides the means to further oppress the population, finances the production of WMDs that could inflict immense suffering on humanity, or is exploited as a political trophy by certain individuals. The international community has long worked together to prevent the flow of war funds into conflict zones. Similar caution must be exercised to ensure that North Korean tourism does not become another ‘blood diamond.’