Dear colleagues,
Dear friends,
Dear guests,
The European Defence Agency was established in an era of optimism.
In 2003, my predecessor Javier Solana wrote that Europe had never been so safe and prosperous.
Just over a decade later, Russia invaded a part of Ukraine and took it for its own. Twenty years later, and Russia’s economy is in full war mode.
Putin is spending well over a third of his country’s budget on the military. This is triple what it was before the war. He shows no sign of stopping or slowing down.
People say I’m a ‘Russia hawk’ – well, I would like to say I am a realist.
For too long we have offered Russia alternatives, hoping that it would choose cooperation and economic prosperity for its people, over fraudulent imperialistic ambitions.
But instead, Russia’s defence industry is churning out tanks, glide bombs, and artillery shells in vast quantities.
In three months they can produce more weapons and more ammunition than we can in twelve. This is a heavily militarised country that presents an existential threat to us all.
We are running out of time. The Ukrainians are fighting for their freedom, and ours.
They are buying us all time. And from day one, the European Union and its Member States have stood by their side.
We have provided well over €130 billion in total. Close to €50 billion in military support. This makes us the biggest international donor of Ukraine.
We will have trained 75,000 Ukrainian soldiers by the end of next month. We have adopted the most wide-sweeping sanctions we have ever imposed.
You cannot fuel an illegal war, deny a country its sovereignty or kill innocent civilians, and get away with it.
Russia must take responsibility for its actions. It has to pay. This is also why the windfall profits from frozen Russian assets – they accrued more than €3 billion last year – are being spent on Ukraine.
This is more ammunition, more air defence and a cash injection in the European Ukrainian defence industry.
I also want to look into doing even more, including on immobilised assets to fight for Ukraine. Every day Russia continues its war, the price must go up.
Now we are working on another – a 16th – package of sanctions.
We have started to see Russia’s economy taking a serious hit.
They could not afford to continue their efforts in Syria while fighting in Ukraine. Russia’s national funds are quickly depleting. The national interest rate is over 20%.
And they are getting far fewer resources from gas and oil. Gazprom is looking at mass layoffs. There is absolutely no doubt we can do more to help Ukraine.
With our help, they can win the war. The only language Putin speaks is the language of strength.
The European Union has strength. Together European Member States’ economies are [9 times] bigger than that of Russia’s economy. We must force their hand to show him they will lose, and stop them before they attack one of our own.
At the root of Europe’s strength is our political and economic union. This is why as soon as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania left the Soviet prison, we all joined the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and swore to be never alone again.
Together we are just so much stronger. “From bitter competition to peaceful and constructive competition.” That is how Robert Schuman described the union of Europe’s coal and steel sectors in 1950.
Of course, he was talking about removing the possibility for Europeans to wage war on each other. And it led to enduring peace between us.
Today we face war from outside. It is time to come together again. As we integrated our economies before, today we need integration in defence and interoperability on the ground.
We do not need a European army. We need 27 European armies that are capable and can effectively work together to deter our rivals and defend Europe. Preferably with our allies and partners; but alone, if needed.
An incrementalist approach to defence cannot work. We must stop tiptoeing around.
This agency lives and breathes European defence, but the rest of us need to as well.
In practice this means, first, a European Union population that understands what’s at stake; second, more spending on defence; third, a society that is prepared for this; fourth, European Union Member States with strong military capabilities and strong defence industries; and fifth, more cooperation with our partners.
This is what we are now looking for in our White Paper and the Preparedness Strategy.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Many of our national intelligence agencies are giving us the information that Russia could test the European Union’s readiness to defend itself in three to five years’ time.
Who else are we listening to if not to them? We need to have a public understanding of the threats we face.
Close to 80% of Europeans are in favour of a common defence and security policy among European Union countries. Over 70% agree the European Union needs to reinforce its capacity to produce military equipment.
I think our citizens know what’s at stake. But politicians have to catch up too.
Russia is not a problem for some of us but for all of us. Europeans need to wake up. Last year, Member States collectively spent an average 1.9% of GDP on defence. Russia is spending 9%.
We spend billions on our schools, healthcare and welfare. But if we don’t invest more in defence, all of this is at risk.
Europe's failure to invest in military capabilities also sends a dangerous signal to the aggressor. Weakness invites them in.
President Trump is right to say we don’t spend enough. It is time to invest.
We need investment from Member States and the private sector, but also from the common European Union budget. We must spend more than one percent. We need to relay a message that we are serious about our commitment to European defence.
Even when we allocate enough money, we also cannot just go to the shop and buy a couple of tanks, an air defence system and few helmets.
The decisions we make today will only materialise in years from now. Two at the best, but a decade in some cases.
I know I am talking to a room with many experts. And those at the European Defence Agency know very well defence is a highly-skilled, highly-intense industry which requires money, people, and time.
We have money and people, but we do not have time. Ukraine is buying us time.
No, we are not at war - not yet. But as my friend Mark Rutte said when he stood on this stage a few weeks ago, “We are not at peace either”.
We need to prepare. There is nothing that cannot be weaponised against us today.
Putin’s regime is already undertaking increasingly brazen acts of sabotage: cyber-attacks in Spain and Czechia; election interference in Romania and Moldova; parcel bombs in Germany; disinformation campaigns; jamming of GPS systems that stops aircraft from landing [in Estonia and Finland]; damage to underwater cables.
We are already the targets of a hybrid war. In December, for the first time ever, we imposed sanctions for such attacks. 16 people and three companies were sanctioned.
Last week we adopted a plan for the cybersecurity of hospitals and healthcare providers. The security risk that the hospitals needed to worry about a decade ago was drug addicts stealing morphine. Today, a cyberattack today could turn off life-support machines, shut down operating theatres and prevent patients from getting life-saving treatment.
Today, this sector is the most attacked sector in the European Union. We must include it in discussions on defence.
Hybrid attacks are often used to prelude to conventional attack, or they are conducted in parallel with conventional attacks. As Sauli Niinistö underlined in his report on preparedness, we must prepare for the worst.
Ladies and gentlemen,
The military needs, capabilities and industrial strength from one Member State to the next are hugely diverse.
From ammunition to air defence, from long-range missiles to cyber defence, from military mobility to the need for protection of borders and underwater cables. This is also what explains the differences in approaches to defence, as well as geography.
Last week I met with Member States to discuss what we should prioritise on the European Union level. Because it is important that Member States agree where the European Union can best support everyone develop their capabilities.
Beyond this, it is important to link capability planning and European Union defence industrial policy.
This is why Commissioner [for Defence and Space, Andrius] Kubilius and I want to put forward an industrial output plan.
Here, we must also learn from past experiences. The million rounds initiative for Ukraine was an Estonian idea. And although we have now delivered well over a million rounds, in the end it was too little, too late.
We need to make sure that we can ramp up our defence industry and get the products we need on time.
We need to join up what we know about our capability gaps and how much we are missing with what our industries can produce. Then we can see how best to help our industry produce this and work with our allies where we can’t do it in-house.
I see the EDA with an instrumental role here. For decades, Europe has produced strategic documents, roadmaps and declarations. It is time we move beyond to more missiles, tanks, and ships.
Russia might have a few friends, but the European Union has more. The United States, United Kingdom and NATO.
First, the United States. They are our strongest ally and must remain so.
A strategically competitive and increasingly confrontational world needs both us and our transatlantic bond at its strongest.
As two of the most powerful economic blocs on the planet, we are a vital artery of the global economy.
And our prosperity is intertwined. The European Union is one of the biggest export markets for the United States, after Canada and Mexico. 65% of Direct Foreign Investments to the U.S. come from Europe. The transatlantic economy employs more than 16 million workers in onshore jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.
In Europe, United States companies earn over two and a half times what they earn from Asia.
We also share a common vision for a safe world. Our adversaries are cooperating and coordinating their actions against us. We must work together against the axis of upheaval.
The biggest concern for the United States is China. But the fact is that if we do not get Russia right, we will not get China right either. China is closely watching how the transatlantic community responds to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
We need to make sure that a lesson is learned: aggression as a foreign policy tool can never pay off.
Ukraine’s security against Russia is security for us all. Weakness here would only feed the confidence of our strategic rivals. But the European Union’s message to the United States is clear: we must do more for our own defence and shoulder a fair share of responsibility for Europe’s security.
And we can be a closer partner for the United States in the Indo-Pacific.
On [the] United Kingdom; they have left the Union but they have not left Europe. They are still part of Europe.
And they are one of the strongest military powers in Europe. The United Kingdom is a key partner for the European Union. We need a mutually beneficial relationship on security and defence. A new agreement on this is a logical next step.
This brings me to NATO cooperation.
NATO remains the foundation of collective defence and is crucial for Euro-Atlantic security.
The European Union and NATO have 23 members in common, we are the most natural of partners. And at a time when we worry about attacks against us, we need to concentrate our European Union defence capability priorities, where they are most needed.
Less crisis management, more collective defence.
This is what the European Defence Agency should help with too. Because every EU Member State has a single set of defence planners and one defence budget.
With this approach, the European Union will support NATO – we will support each other’s work – not duplicate each other’s efforts.
Twenty years after the European Defence Agency was born, I do not think we are seeing the full potential of this agency yet. I want it to do more. And this will also complement NATO’s work.
On fragmentation. Across 11 main categories of major weapons systems, aircraft, ground vehicles and combat vessels, the United States has 32, we – in Europe - have 172.
In practice, this fragmentation pushes the costs up, limits interoperability, and creates logistical issues.
Ukraine receives several different types of artillery systems and shells from us. They have had to adjust their guns when they are firing.
We need to consolidate our defence industry and develop common weapons systems.
Our European defence industry could then use the same military systems and help Member States’ militaries become more interoperable.
The EDA already helps to create these synergies through cooperation projects with several Member States.
And in a single market, with huge untapped industrial potential, the European Union should also work on a Single Market for Defence.
On research and innovation, I also see the European Defence Agency as a real European incubator for defence. It can bring our brightest minds together for research and innovation on future defence projects. We should also think about defence in terms of jobs and innovation that is extremely positive for the rest of us and for the rest of society too. Without innovation in defence, we would not have the internet, GPS, nuclear energy or drones. Likewise, defence should reap the benefits of civilian-driven innovation in AI, robotics, and space.
The EDA is currently working on satellite technology that could have huge benefits for our militaries. They are looking at how to easily manoeuvre satellites from low orbits, where observation is better but the risks of satellite damage is higher, back to higher orbits where they are safer.
And when together we invest, it costs much less.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Although I see around the room mostly gentlemen.
As we celebrate twenty years of the European Defence Agency, we are no longer in an era of optimism but of opposition.
We all need to be realistic about Russia. Russia poses an existential threat to our security today, tomorrow and for as long as we underinvest in our defence.
Three priorities [to underline]: first, Ukraine is Europe’s frontline for defence.
We need more, faster and stronger support for Ukraine, because the only language the Kremlin understands is the language of strength.
Russia is not invincible. Russia’s limited territorial gains in Ukraine come with unsustainably high losses and a crumbling economy. Time is not on Russia’s side. But it is not necessarily on our side either, because we are not yet doing enough.
Second, there should be no doubt in any of our minds that we must spend more to prevent war – but we also need to prepare for war. We need to improve our capabilities; we need our defence industry to produce what we need; [and] we must prepare for the worst. But we should also see this as a positive opportunity to develop a stronger technological base in Europe.
Third, we must work together with our allies too – with the United States, the United Kingdom and NATO and our partners across the globe. In such turbulent times, we need to stick together. There are countries that are fighting against us all that are directly opposed to who we are, what we stand for, and the way we live our lives.
Together, we have more than enough strength to defeat them. We must make use of this strength.
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