Power & Influence in New World Order

In the old-world order, power was distributed in a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the upper chessboard, we found predominantly unilateral military power, largely retained by the United States.

On the middle chessboard, economic power, characterized by multipolarity, remained the defining force for over a decade, with major players being the US, Europe, Japan, and China, alongside others gaining increasing importance.

As for the lower chessboard, it represented transnational relations beyond national borders, encompassing non-state actors such as electronic money transfer bankers, arms-dealing terrorists, cyber pirates threatening cybersecurity, as well as challenges like pandemics and climate change.

Not to forget the presence of some military actors, like Russian Wagner mercenaries or insurgents in sub-Saharan Africa.

This last chessboard has become more influential, more present, and is affecting the new world order, which is increasingly foggy and complex as never before.

Compare this to:

President Emmanuel Macron announced a few days ago that the French ambassador to Niger would return to France "in the coming hours," and that French forces would leave the country by the end of the year, following a two-month standoff with the Nigerien military council.

Just days before, during a visit to the Somoa-Ongozioua region in the east-central part of the country, Macron declared that the ruling military council in Niger was "detaining" his country's ambassador and diplomatic staff as "hostages" in the embassy.

He stated at the time that the military personnel who ousted President Mohamed Bazoum on July 26 "are preventing (them) from eating, and the ambassador is having military meals."

When asked about the possibility of the ambassador's return to Paris, Macron stated, "I will do what we agree on with President Bazoum because he is the legitimate authority, and I talk to him every day."

What does this mean? Despite the presence of 1,500 French soldiers in Niger, and despite the fact that this presence is a strategic and vital matter for France in Africa, given its security and diplomatic stature, French forces have been unable to confront the insurgents in Niger diplomatically or militarily. They have even failed to provide "civilian" meals for their ambassador there.

We remember what happened to France in Mali two years ago when it had to withdraw all its troops from the town. France and the international community were unable to exert the necessary pressures and sanctions on the military council in Mali to deter it from turning to mercenaries like Wagner or restoring power to civilians.

Moreover, the US no longer cares much about the region, and France has not adopted an international or European policy from the outset to justify its presence in the region as international support.

Furthermore, one should not forget that the determinant factor for all international reactions in the region lies in the "fear" of the actors belonging to the lower chessboard and the lack of proactive and actual knowledge about them.

This fear is steadily growing, making the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) refrain from intervening militarily in Niger to end the coup and return President Mohamed Bazoum, who is currently detained, to his position.

The lack of strategic and genuine knowledge about these actors has caused countries like France to suffer the strategic failure of their strategies in various areas such as Niger and Mali, as well as the Sahel region.

The internal political changes in these countries (military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) were not foreseen by France, leading it to develop long-term strategies from the outset.

Moreover, the G5 Sahel countries (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mauritania) cannot form a unified strategic entity after the recent military coups, and France bears the consequences of its anti-French winds in the region after several years of military presence.

The international environment has undergone significant changes, and the theory of "power weakness" described by Bertrand Badie in his writings has begun to manifest itself. Badie has summarized this theory in two words, "power weakness," and based on theories by Emile Durkheim and Hugo Grotius, he emphasized that the traditional classic concept of power has lost much of its meaning with the increasing number of actors in the complex international environment.

I firmly believe that the old concept of power is now meaningless, as wars take the form of cyberattacks or the proliferation of unidentified sources of weapons.

Some powerful states, like the United States, no longer possess the same economic, military, and protective power they once had. Bipolarity or unipolarity no longer have the same connotations in light of the rise of Asian economies, other economies, the expansion of the global financial crisis, global trade competition, the growth of global crime, globalization of services, the increase in mercenaries, and "non-state" military actors in many parts of the world. Moreover, individuals are playing an increasingly prominent role in international relations, signifying an increase in the influence of actors on the lower chessboard.

To succeed in this new world order, one must possess smart strategic glasses that enable a comprehensive view of the current and future international security environment and advance planning for the outcomes of continuity and change within this environment, ensuring the flourishing of strategic interests in the future.

Although some, including myself, argue that the future cannot be precisely predicted, it can undoubtedly be influenced, shaping its features to achieve strategic interests.

This is the rule that countries like China and Russia have begun to apply in Africa. France, on the other hand, has failed to understand it, finding itself outside the chessboard in a world characterized by fluctuation, apprehension, complexity, and ambiguity.