The first anniversary of the October 7 Attack passed amid heightened security across Israel, with increased alertness in the West Bank and the Gaza border area. A recent poll revealed that 85% of Israelis now refuse to live or stay in the Gaza border region following the end of the war, while 61% of Israelis report feeling insecure. The Middle East is expected to experience significant geopolitical shifts that could influence the region for decades. The year 2023 may be remembered as a foundational period for a new balance of power—similar to the changes of 2001 and 2011—potentially reshaping strategic alliances across the region.
These shifts will likely redefine relationships between countries traditionally seen as part of the Middle East and adjacent regions, such as the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa. These areas, along with global powers, particularly the United States, will play a key role in shaping the region's future. For now, the U.S. remains the most influential external force in the Middle East.
Washington’s Middle East policy continues to follow the framework set by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: to ensure that the U.S. remains the dominant international actor in the region and prevent any other global power—whether it was the Soviet Union in the past or China today—from replacing American influence. Although U.S. involvement in the region had diminished in recent years, it began to recover in mid-2023, just weeks before the October 7 events.
Despite Washington's staunch support for Israel damaging its image in Arab public opinion, a key shift post-October 7 has been the divide within American society regarding the U.S.'s unconditional backing of Tel Aviv. Younger Americans, in particular, have begun to question Israel's actions, accusing it of war crimes and practicing apartheid in Palestinian territories. This growing dissent led President Biden to issue mild criticisms of the Netanyahu government. The cooling of relations between the two countries has not gone unnoticed by the Israeli media, and one Israeli analyst wrote in Maariv in August 2024 that Israel’s strategic alliance with the U.S. is its "only life insurance policy."
Since the October 7 events, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been maneuvering to avoid being held solely responsible for the attack. As Israel's longest-serving prime minister, Netanyahu is fully aware of the legal trials that await him and has thus focused on deflecting diplomatic efforts aimed at de-escalating the conflict, implementing a ceasefire, allowing the return of Palestinian refugees, and delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza. Instead, Netanyahu has sought to ignite further military confrontations, aiming to shift the region’s focus from Iran's growing influence to solidifying Israel’s strategic depth.
The aftermath of the October 7 attack, especially in areas like Sderot and the Gaza border, revealed the fragility of Israeli society. The psychological shock of broken taboos—such as the perceived invincibility of the Israeli Defense Forces and its missile defense system—triggered a sense of panic and confusion. A similar shock occurred fifty years earlier during the October 6, 1973 war, in which the Egyptian army dealt a historic defeat to Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula. That conflict forced Israeli leaders to admit their defeat and laid the groundwork for the first steps toward peace negotiations in the region, long sought by Arab states and resisted by Israel.
Israeli media have pointed out that the shock of October 2023 marked the first time since 1948 that Jewish settlers in northern Israel were evacuated from their homes. The October 7 attack made Israel’s home front a central battleground, a fact that Netanyahu's far-right government used to justify severe human rights abuses and violations of international law. To distract from these actions, Netanyahu opened new fronts outside Gaza and intensified political assassinations, further exacerbating political and humanitarian crises in the region.
As the international community’s response to these crises lagged—largely influenced by pro-Israel biases or hesitation to fully back Palestinian rights—Israel continued its aggressive settlement expansion and human rights violations in the West Bank. Despite efforts by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), their actions have done little to ease the suffering of over two million Palestinians under siege in Gaza or halt Israeli settlement activities. The continued failure to address these issues reinforced the perception that international actors operate with double standards. In response, grassroots movements such as Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) have gained momentum, offering a form of solidarity that exerts economic and moral pressure on the supporters of the Israeli occupation.
Internally, prior to October 7, Israeli society was deeply divided over judicial reforms. However, after the attack, these divisions were overshadowed by growing doubts about the very viability of Israel as a state. During the Gaza war, internal opposition forces made several attempts to oust Netanyahu’s far-right government but were met with limited success. Israeli media, meanwhile, focused on the strained relations between the Biden administration and Israel, the contentious issue of ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) conscription, and their role in defending illegal settlements in the West Bank. Despite this, Netanyahu continued targeting Palestinian resistance leaders through assassinations, aiming to consolidate his political power and prolong the Gaza war until after the U.S. elections.
Simultaneously, Netanyahu and Israeli officials grew increasingly concerned about potential charges from the ICC. Yet these fears did little to alter Israel’s expansionist policies. Netanyahu, viewing himself as “the chosen one” to implement these plans, has sought to change the rules of engagement, particularly regarding the confrontations with Hezbollah in Lebanon. By escalating tensions with Hezbollah and drawing them into more open conflicts, Netanyahu has tactically exploited the period before the U.S. elections, anticipating that a Democratic administration, particularly one led by Kamala Harris, would be less favorable to Israel than a potential return of Donald Trump.
Regardless of differing views on the links between the Gaza and Lebanon fronts, the events of October 7—along with the resulting Palestinian and Lebanese displacements, political assassinations, and Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon—are poised to trigger significant shifts in the region’s political and security landscape. Several actors, both regional and global, are already recalibrating their strategic plans based on new alliances and power dynamics. These changes may also affect internal structures, such as Lebanon’s sectarian political system and the potential partition of northern Syria, all of which are intertwined with broader geopolitical shifts, including trade routes, supply chains, and energy security.
Translated by: Hassanain Tayea
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