Diplomacy Rules by Dr. Abdelhak Azzouzi

By Dr. Abdelhak Azzouzi

Those who are well-versed in the field of international relations know that the head of state, by virtue of his constitutional position, holds the reins of diplomacy and foreign policies, and manages the state's foreign affairs with foreign countries and methods of dealing with them, and directs the work of diplomats, including his country's foreign minister and ambassadors accredited to foreign countries; these are the representatives and implementers of the directives of the state's foreign decisions; the head of state.

If the expression is correct, the head of state carries out the process of theorizing and strategy, and diplomats become planners par excellence for implementing the state's foreign decisions. in other words, the head of state formulates the strategy in line with the total available forces, stakes and capabilities; he must also have an advanced intellectual system and sufficient knowledge and awareness that enables him to deduce the most important components of the uncertain stage and the almost unknown future to reach the desired goals and achieve the required ends.

The work of the strategist is also different from the planner. In the field of military intervention, for example, the role of the planner revolves around how to use weapons in battle to achieve the maximum return as envisioned by strategists, meaning that the scope of his intervention remains linked to the various procedures and measures that the field command must take in the place of military operations; and if this is his role, then this is similar to the role of the diplomat who must carry out a set of field measures in the place of diplomatic operations to achieve the higher goals set by the president of the country.

In addition, foreign ministers and diplomats are obligated to implement the foreign decisions of the head of state whether they are convinced of them or not. This reminds me of what General-Diplomat Colin Powell did in the American war against Iraq, where he was one of the literal implementers of Bush's policy in Iraq without agreeing with him and with the president's neo-conservative advisors who were among the White House's seniors at that time; and all of this is documented in Colin Powell's memoirs that he published before his death.

Colin Powell, who belongs to the moderate school, led the efforts to promote the Iraq war when he assumed the position of Secretary of State and contributed to creating a gap between international legitimacy based on preserving the world order and the quasi-legal strategic view that is not based on purely philosophical legal spectacles.. The American-British military intervention occurred despite the French-Western rejection and the various legal obstacles in the United Nations, and the rest is known.

Colin Powell does not bear the responsibility alone, as the qualified professors of strategic art, during the era of President Bush (the son), were the neo-conservatives, and their foreign policy during that period and their military intervention without strategic wisdom still weigh heavily on American foreign policy.

Confusion has occurred in strategic work, because members of the diplomatic and national security team work at different levels, and have different roles in the state, and hierarchical organizational structures, and everyone needs to respect their role and work, from planning, strategy and policy, in order to communicate effectively, and to exchange information among themselves, and ultimately with the American people. This confusion is what led to the deviation of some roles for some American institutions, and thus to weak production and productivity, and this refers us here to the value of the role of advisors in formulating strategy.

American policy is full of lessons in this regard

The weakness in production and productivity is the result of what we can conclude from the requirements of a speech recently delivered by French President Emmanuel Macron on the occasion of the annual meeting of French ambassadors in Paris, during which he touched on a number of topics, most notably French-African relations.

For years, strategic wisdom has been absent in framing French-African relations, and planning diplomats have failed to produce positive results in France's favor; with a kind of reproach, President Macron criticized the ingratitude of the countries of the African Sahel region, which he said forgot to thank Paris for preventing them from falling into the hands of extremists, rejecting the suggestion that his country was forced out of the region, meaning the failure of French strategy and planning.

French forces have withdrawn in the past few years from Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso after successive military coups, and are now on their way to withdrawing from Chad, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire.

The response of the head of the military council in Burkina Faso, Ibrahim Traoré, to the French president's speech was resounding when he said literally: "This is how this man sees Africa, this is how he sees Africans. We are not human beings in his eyes," accusing the French president of "insulting all Africans" and calling on African countries to cancel all agreements with France and not just demand that it leave military bases in their countries.

When the central strategy fails in making diplomatic wisdom, confusion occurs in the entire diplomatic work, and this leads to weak production and productivity, and this is the hidden side in explaining the failure of many foreign policies.