Supervisor Elham AbolFateh
Editor in Chief Mohamed Wadie

Afghanistan and Phrasing of the US Decisions


Tue 24 Aug 2021 | 03:57 PM
opinion .

Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK) Tony Blair, who entangled his country in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to support the United States of America (USA), affirmed that relinquishing Afghanistan and its people is very risky and unnecessary matter.

He indicated that this never benefits Afghans or Britain which becomes outside the European Union (EU).

Little consulting or non-consulting at all over the US withdrawal from Afghanistan means that Britain is exposed to become a second-rate power among the world powers.

At last, Russia, China, and Iran will benefit from the withdrawal of the Western powers from Afghanistan.

I read this and memorize that period when Tony Blair was PM and George Bush Jr., President of the USA and I remember how decisions were made then.

The Neo-Conservatives were the qualified advisers and their foreign policy of that period and their military intervention is still in effect without accurate points of view.

This policy makes the White House, US foreign policy, and the future of the US national security pay through the nose.

Until now, the strategic work was exposed to disorder because teams responsible for diplomacy and national security work at various levels and have various roles in the state along with hierarchical structures so all officials need to respect roles and jobs such as planning, strategy, and politics to communicate with each other in an active manner and the American people in the end.

This anarchy led to the aberration of some US institutions and caused weakness in revenues and productivity which reflects the unseen aspect of some US reports. Theories of strategy in international politics warned about that.

These theories push us to study the role of advisers in phrasing a strategy so US politics is filled with lessons in that aspect.

Executive bodies are managerial terms that mean various ministries, directorates, national councils, and other institutions that form together with the managerial structure of the state. They perform their constitutional duties under the leadership of the head of the state as chief of the executive power and president as in the USA and France and other countries.

This system contains a big difficulty, as in foreign policy and national security because who is responsible for these matters should adopt a holistic view of things due to the role of an inpidual becomes very important. Thus value or limitations of officials often appears at major political events.

Many observers, for example, thought that the former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was a man with limited talents because of his leadership and vision of the role of defense, and on top of these are military observers and the military forces.

But the facts were soon revealed, especially after the events of September 11, 2011. Rumsfeld's hardness, rudeness, and the quality of his strategic thought became clear after these events.

We all remember the specific type of thought of the Neo-Conservatives in the first presidential term of Bush Jr., which changed the tide of the international system, especially in the Middle East.

The four features of the modern strategic architecture: volatility, apprehension, complexity, and ambiguity drive American presidents to adopt multiple decision-making mechanisms.

The advisers play a major role in this field. If we remain in the example of the USA, and its foreign policy, we will remember the vast gap in thinking and organizing between Colin Powell, Secretary of State during the era of Bush Jr., and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.

We know here that the US Department of State and Defense Department are linked to military power. Military superiority and power give the necessary impetus to US diplomacy, and the latter is in dialogue with military power, to achieve political success.

Colin Powell was rejecting military intervention without international legitimacy, but Rumsfeld had the last word, and so far the issue of identifying the wrong official in the current failure to establish stability in several regions, such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

Every follower of American foreign and domestic policy comes out with a very meaningful result, which is that when the American president depends on a group of trusted advisors only and this becomes a  means for the emergence of the phenomenon of unilateral group thinking.

The problem here is that the president’s endless trust in these advisors, often as a result of the similarity and harmony in the mentalities between the members of the group.

I mean the political ideology, and the view of the internal system and the world, and the end result is that the president often hears what he already knows.

He is well aware of and believes in it with the utmost faith, thus restricting decision-making centrally to the top of the state.

The real knowledge remains at the lower levels of the structural system of the state, or with people who have expertise in understanding, thinking, planning, and theorizing, who are more deserving of advice than the current advisors.

Contributed by Ahmed Moamar